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I. INTRODUCTION
The specter of political corruption has loomed over democracy since its
1
inception in Ancient Athens. To prevent corruption, political reform in Athens

1. See John Camp, Ostracized in Athens: Ancient Greeks Knew How to Dump Bad Pols, N.Y. TIMES, Jul.
24, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/24/opinion/24iht-edcamp_ed3_html (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (describing the Athenian practice of ostracizing politicians who threatened the democracy).
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2

took a simpler form than it does today. The people would first vote on whether
3
they felt there was a person that posed a threat to democracy. If the people
decided that there was, then every citizen of Athens voted for the person they
4
perceived as the greatest threat. The Athenian that received the most votes was
5
then exiled from Athens for a decade. The process was called ostracism, named
for the ostracon, or shards of pottery, on which Athenians would write the name
6
of the man he deemed worthy of exile. It is an institution that California
lawmakers may have wished was still available to them following the indictment
7
of three California Senators in 2014.
While California has traditionally eschewed the practice of ostracism, the
state has proactively regulated politics, with the most prominent example being
8
the Political Reform Act of 1974. However, the indictment of three of their own
9
spurred California lawmakers to realize that California needed new regulations.
The importance of the moment was not lost on Senator Darrel Steinberg, who
10
declared that “[s]ometimes it takes a crisis” to pass new ethics reform bills.
Among the pieces of legislation spawned by this crisis was SB 831, which
11
addressed gifts of travel to legislators, behested payments to nonprofit
organizations, and campaign fund expenditures, each of which played a role in
12
the Senatorial indictments that began the process.
Part II of this Article will address the legal history of political reform efforts
in California. Part III will discuss the proposed effects of SB 831. Part IV will
analyze what the impact of SB 831 would have been on California.

2. See id. (comparing the California recall process to Athenian ostracism).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See Norimitsu Onishi, California Democrats Await Fallout After 3 Are Caught Up in Scandals, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/04/us/california-democrats-await-fallout-after-3-arecaught-up-in-scandals.html?_r=0 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the indictments of the
California Senators).
8. See About the Political Reform Act, CAL. FAIR POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM’N, http://www.fppc.ca.
gov/index.php?id=221 (last visited June 18, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the
Political Reform Act).
9. Jessica Calefati, Support Wanes in Sacramento for Tough Ethics Reform Following Scandal, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, July 6, 2014, http://www.mercurynews.com/california/ci_26095376/support-wanes-toughethics-reform-following-scandal (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
10. Id.
11. Senate Bill 831 does not define “behested,” but Merriam-Webster defines “behest” as “an
authoritative order” or “an urgent prompting.” Behest, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/behest?show=0&t=1417208066, (last visited Dec. 15, 2014) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
12. SB 831 §§ 1(a), 3(a), 8(a) 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sep. 9, 2014, but not enacted);
see Patrick McGreevy, Nonprofits Tied to Legislators Collect Cash out of Public View, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2013,
http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-legislature-nonprofits-20131117-story.html#axzz2kwqVHG7x&page=1 (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing Senator Calderon’s use of his brother’s nonprofit to hide contributions
from special interest groups).
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This section will first address the history of political reform in California
prior to the Political Reform Act of 1974 (PRA). It will then discuss the PRA in
general and describe the areas of law affected by SB 831 in greater depth.
A. The History of Political Reform in California
Regulating the conduct of politicians and the multitude of special interests
surrounding them has been an area of concern for the California legislature for
over half a century; the legislature has passed over eighty distinct statutes in an
13
ongoing effort to police itself. Efforts to consolidate the various regulations into
a more comprehensive piece of legislation began in 1969 with an overbroad
disclosure statute that the California Supreme Court deemed unconstitutionally
14
restrictive in City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young in 1970 and continued with
the Moscone Governmental Conflicts of Interest and Disclosure Act (Moscone
15
Act) in 1973. The Moscone Act, while not found unconstitutional, was
16
subsumed by the PRA just a year after its passage.
B. The Political Reform Act of 1974
A landmark piece of political legislation was passed in 1974 when voters
17
approved Proposition 9 by a large majority. “The [PRA] was . . .
18
comprehensive, covering all areas of political reform.” In addition, the PRA
created the Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) and empowered it both to
enforce the title’s provisions and to create new regulations in order to further the
19
PRA’s goals.
1. What is a Contribution Under the PRA?
Section 82015 of the California Government Code, enacted by the PRA,
20
defines the types of payments that qualify as contributions. The statute defines a
contribution as “a payment, a forgiveness of a loan, a payment of a loan by a

13. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 262, 466 P.2d 225, 227 (1970).
14. 2 Cal. 3d at 272, 466 P.2d 235.
15. Jeri McKeand, The Political Reform Act of 1974: A Critical Look at Conflict of Interest and
Disclosure Requirements, 5 W. ST. U. L. REV. 269, 269–70 (1978).
16. Id. at 270.
17. About the Political Reform Act, supra note 8.
18. McKeand, supra note 15, at 271 (“Besides the conflict of interest and disclosure provisions, the Act
regulates Campaign Disclosures, Lobbyists, Ballot Pamphlets, Incumbency, Auditing of Statements,
Enforcement, and sets up the Fair Political Practices Commission to administer the Act.”) (citations omitted).
19. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 83100, 83111, 83112 (West 2005).
20. Id. § 82015.
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third party, or an enforceable promise to make a payment except to the extent
that full and adequate consideration is received, unless it is clear from the
21
surrounding circumstances that it is not made for political purposes.” The
section goes on to specify that any payment of this kind made “at the behest” of a
22
committee or candidate also qualifies as a contribution. The statute lists specific
circumstances in which payments are “unrelated” to political purposes and
23
includes payments made by nonprofit organizations. Thus, under section 82015,
payments made by nonprofit organizations, even when at the behest of a
24
candidate or elected officer, are not contributions.
Contributions are a small part of a broader concern about lobbying that was a
25
major motivation for passing the PRA. The desire for stricter and broader
regulation over lobbying activities likely contributed to the overwhelming
26
passage of Proposition 9 in 1974. Inhibiting lobbying activities perceived as
27
improper was the driving force behind the PRA.
2. How Does the PRA Treat Gifts of Travel?
California Government Code section 89506 deals with payments made for
travel expenses that are “reasonably related to a legislative or governmental
28
purpose.” The statute lays out two exceptions to the normal limitations placed
29
on gifts by Government Code section 89503. The first exception is narrowly
restricted to payment of travel expenses incurred for speeches given by
30
candidates and elected officials. The second, however, is much broader: it
provides that travel payments made by “a government, a governmental agency, a
foreign government, a governmental authority, a bona fide public or private
educational institution, . . . [or] a nonprofit organization” are not subject to
31
normal gift limitations. This exception was created to allow charitable and
32
educational entities to pay public officials to speak at their events. However, in
21. Id. § 82015(a).
22. Id. § 82015(b).
23. Id. § 82015(b)(2)(B)(ii).
24. Id.
25. See Stephen Landuyt, Disclosure and Individual Rights: Influencing the Legislative Process Under
the Political Form Act of 1974, 8 PAC. L.J. 939, 955–56 (1977) (“By passing the Political Reform Act of 1974,
the people of California expressed their desire to have stricter controls and additional disclosure requirements
placed on lobbying activities to inhibit and uncover improper influences directed at the legislative process.”).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. GOV’T § 89506(a).
29. Id. § 89506.
30. Id. § 89506(a)(1).
31. Id. § 89506(a)(2).
32. PHILLIP UNG, CAL. COMMON CAUSE, GIFTS, INFLUENCE, AND POWER: A REPORT ON GIFTS GIVEN TO
CALIFORNIA’S ELECTED OFFICIALS 9 (2013), available at http://www.commoncause.org/research-reports/CA_
122013_Report_Gifts_Given_to_California-s_Elected_Officials_1.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
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2013 nonprofit organizations used the loophole to reimburse public officials for
33
over $500,000 in travel payments. Concerns about gifts, including those
34
disguised as travel expenses, were reflected in the PRA. Indeed, some
academics expressed concerns that interest groups would use these types of gifts
35
to unduly influence legislators.
3. How Does the PRA Treat Charitable Donations?
Section 89515 of the California Government Code declares that the donation
of campaign funds to “bona fide charitable, educational, civic, religious, or
similar tax-exempt nonprofit organizations” is permissible, provided that “no
substantial part” of the donation will confer a financial benefit on “the candidate,
elected officer, campaign treasurer, or any individual or individuals with
authority to approve the expenditure of campaign funds held by a committee, or
36
member of his or her immediate family.” It also requires that the donation
“bear[] a reasonable relation to a political, legislative, or governmental
37
purpose.” The statute provides no definition of what constitutes a financial
benefit, nor does it provide any clarity on what it means by a “substantial part of
38
the proceeds.” However, FPPC regulations state that a “financial effect” is
39
material “if it is at least $250 in any 12-month period.” Large donations to the
favorite charities of politicians are exempt from regulation as long as the
40
donation confers no direct material benefit on the public official or his family.
41
However, the growing prevalence of these donations suggests a new trend. Gifts
to legislators, whether directly or indirectly, were a major concern to legal
42
commentators during the passage of the PRA.
4. What Types of Campaign Fund Expenditures Does the PRA Restrict?
California Government Code Section 89513 prohibits specific types of
43
campaign fund expenditures. The beginning of the statute deals directly with
33. Jeremy B. White, California Lawmakers Enjoyed $550,000 Worth of Paid Travel in 2013,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 4, 2014, http://www.sacbee.com/2014/03/04/6209174/ california-lawmakers-enjoyed550000.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
34. See Landuyt, supra note 25, at 945–46 (discussing concerns about direct and indirect gifts).
35. See id. at 955–56 (noting wariness about undue influence being exerted on legislators).
36. Id. § 89515.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 18705.5 (2014).
40. GOV’T §89515.
41. See Anthony York, Jerry Brown’s Charter Schools in Oakland Reap Big Donations, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/aug/08/local/la-me-brown-charities-20110808 (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (noting the increasing popularity of such donations).
42. Landuyt, supra note 25, at 955–56.
43. GOV’T § 89513.
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travel expenses incurred by candidates, their staff members, and their families.
It specifies that campaign funds may not be used to pay or reimburse a candidate
or staffer for travel expenses unless those expenses are “directly related to a
45
political, legislative, or governmental purpose” and provides that the standard
for determining whether travel expenses are sufficiently related will be similar to
46
the federal income tax law standards.
In addition to regulating travel expenditures, this section of the PRA also
47
prohibits a number of other specific expenditures of campaign funds. Section
48
89513 prohibits the use of campaign funds to pay for professional services,
49
health-related expenses (including medical appointments and health club dues),
or clothing for the candidate (unless it is “specialty clothing . . . not suitable for
everyday use . . . [that] is directly related to a political, legislative, or
50
governmental purpose”).
51
The PRA also regulates the use of campaign funds on vehicles. Government
Code section 89516 outlines two requirements for the permissible purchase or
52
lease of a vehicle with campaign funds. The first requirement mandates that title
to the vehicle be held by the committee, rather than by the “candidate, elected
officer, campaign treasurer, or any other individual or individuals with authority
to approve the expenditure of campaign funds held by a committee, or a member
53
of his or her immediate family.” The second requires that the vehicle’s use
54
“directly relate[] to a political, legislative, or governmental purpose.”
California Government Code section 89517 governs the use of campaign
55
funds for the purchase and lease of real property. It completely bans the use of
56
campaign funds to purchase real property. However, it permits the use of
campaign funds for the lease of real property, as well as the lease and
refurbishment of appliances so long as the lessor or sublessor is not “a candidate,
elected officer, campaign treasurer, or any individual or individuals with
authority to approve the expenditure of campaign funds, or member of his or her
immediate family” and the property or appliance is “directly related to a political,

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. § 89513(a).
Id.
Id. § 89513(a)(1).
Id. § 89513(b)–(g).
Id. § 89513(b)(1).
Id. § 89513(b)(2).
Id. § 89513(d).
Id. § 89516.
Id. § 89516 (a).
Id. § 89516(a)(1).
Id. § 89516(a)(2).
Id. § 89517.
Id. § 89517(b).
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legislative, or governmental purpose” such that any other use is “only incidental”
57
to that purpose.
III. SB 831
SB 831 would have changed campaign finance rules regarding gifts of
58
59
travel, behested donations to nonprofit organizations, and expenditures of
60
campaign funds. All restrictions placed on nonprofit organizations by SB 831
61
would have applied only to 501(c)(4) organizations.
A. Travel-Related Gifts
SB 831 would have increased disclosure from nonprofit organizations when
62
they give gifts of travel. The bill would have required these groups to disclose
the names of all donors who “knew or had reason to know that the donation
63
would be used for a payment, advance, or reimbursement for travel.” These
rules would only have applied to groups who provide more than $10,000 of total
travel donations in a single year or who give more than $5,000 in gifts of travel
64
to a single individual.
B. Behested Donations to Nonprofits
SB 831 outlines new restrictions regarding the solicitation of payments to
nonprofit organizations owned or controlled by the elected officer, any other
elected officer serving on the same elective body, or a family member of any
65
elected officer on that body. SB 831 would have prohibited making these
behested payments to nonprofit organizations “owned or controlled” by a public
66
official or a member of his family.” This prohibition would have stopped these
types of donations from being exempted from normal restrictions on campaign
67
contributions. It also would have prohibited elected officers from soliciting

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
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Id. § 89517.
SB 831 § 3(a), 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sep. 5, 2014, but not enacted).
Id. at § 1(a).
Id. at § 4.
Id. at § 1(a).
Id. at § 3(a).
Id.
Id.
Id. at § 6.
Id. at § 1(a).
Id. at § 6.
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68

these payments to charities from nonprofit organizations. The only nonprofit
69
groups to which these restrictions would have applied are 501(c)(4) groups.
C. Limits on the Use of Campaign Funds
Senate Bill 831 would have required that the use of any vehicle purchased
70
with campaign funds be “related to an election campaign,” a subtle change from
the previous requirement that it be “related to a political, legislative, or
71
governmental purpose.” It also would have forbade the use of campaign funds
to make payments for personal vacations for candidates, elected officers, and
72
their employees. In addition, SB 831 sought to prohibit the use of campaign
funds to purchase or lease real property or appliances when the lessee or owner
of the item in question is a candidate, elected officer, or another individual
73
authorized to approve campaign spending. Along the same lines, campaign
funds would no longer have been allowed to be used to pay membership dues at
any kind of recreational facility, including country clubs or health clubs, or to
74
pay tuition. SB 831 also would have disallowed the use of campaign funds for
75
any clothing for a candidate or elected officer.
IV. ANALYSIS
This section discusses the benefits and potential insufficiencies contributing
76
to the hypothetical impact of the passage of SB 831. Part A considers the
proposed restrictions and disclosure requirements for gifts of travel expenses.
Part B examines the proposed changes to donations to nonprofits at the behest of
an elected official. Part C explores the proposed restrictions on the use of
campaign funds for what might be considered personal expenses of a candidate
or elected official. Finally, Part D discusses competing rationale for Governor
Brown’s veto of SB 831.

68. Id. at § 1(a).
69. Id.
70. Id. at § 7.
71. Id.
72. Id. at § 4.
73. Id. at § 8.
74. Id. at § 4.
75. Id.
76. See UNG, supra note 32 (discussing loopholes in the PRA that have been used by politicians); see also
Calefati, supra note 9 (discussing the aims and potential failings of SB 831).
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A. Gifts of Travel
77

One of the primary foci of SB 831 centers on gifts of travel. These gifts,
when made by educational institutions or nonprofit organizations are not subject
78
to normal gift restrictions. In other words, after the veto of SB 831, nonprofit
organizations can still subsidize unlimited travel costs for public officials and
79
avoid the limitations ordinarily placed on campaign contributions. Watchdog
groups like Common Cause have viewed gifts of travel as a potentially
underhanded way for organizations to curry favor with politicians outside the
80
confines of political regulation.
The Sacramento Bee reported that in 2013, politicians in California received
81
over $550,000 in free travel. That number represents a significant increase from
82
the 2012 level of $329,000. According to the study, these trips were funded by a
variety of sources, including “foreign governments, foundations fueled by
83
corporate and labor money[,] and nonprofits tied to specific industries.” The
84
trips included excursions to countries including Switzerland, Taiwan, and Israel.
85
Multiple lawmakers received over $30,000 in gifts of travel.
While these isolated numbers may seem troubling, Robert Stern, a co-author
of the PRA, has said that “[t]here is no inherent issue with [Legislators]
86
travel[ing]. . . .” Lawmakers can benefit in a variety of ways from seeing how
87
other governments function. However, the underlying concern is that special
interests use these unlimited gifts of travel to garner undue influence over the
88
legislators whose excursions they subsidize. According to Common Cause,
many special interests use, or even establish, nonprofit organizations for the
89
specific purpose of exploiting the travel exception to normal political gift limits.
The report states that while the purpose of the loophole is to allow public
officials to speak at legitimate philanthropic events, the reality is that the
exception may afford special interests an opportunity to influence California
90
lawmakers.
77. SB 831 § 3, 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sep. 5, 2014, but not enacted).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. UNG, supra note 32, at 13.
81. White, supra note 33.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See UNG, supra note 32, at 9 (describing how “a number of special interest groups take advantage of
the travel loophole by setting up or using non-profits” to skirt the $440 gift limit).
89. Id.
90. Id. (“The purpose of this non-profit travel exemption was to allow 501(c)(3) charities providing
public services or philanthropy to invite officials to speak. The reality is the exact opposite.”).
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One major trip reported by the Los Angeles Times was a conference in Maui
91
attended by a number of California legislators. This annual Maui retreat is
sponsored by nonprofit organizations that are funded by interest groups including
the cigarette maker Altria, Southern California Edison, a pharmaceutical
92
manufacturing association, and the California Beer and Beverage Distributors.
One of the event’s organizers said that the event was held to “give[] the
sponsoring companies an opportunity to talk about what their business is like in
93
California.” While these trips may create the appearance of impropriety, it is
94
important to remember that they serve valuable purposes for legislators.
95
Despite concern regarding these travel gifts, SB 831 stopped short of
96
banning or even limiting these gifts of travel. Instead, it would have only
97
imposed disclosure requirements. SB 831 would have required that nonprofits
and other organizations that subsidize travel over a certain amount disclose not
just the gift, but the specific donors who knew or had reason to know about it as
98
well.
Senator Jerry Hill, the sponsor of SB 831, stated that this would further the
99
goal of “increas[ing] the transparency of these travel-related gifts.” Indeed,
requiring these nonprofits to disclose the names of the donors who made the
travel gifts possible would reveal the types of special interests that Common
Cause suggests are using nonprofit groups as a shield behind which they can
100
donate to politicians anonymously. The Supreme Court has made the state’s
interest in requiring political disclosure clear by indicating that disclosure is
critically important to help voters better grasp the political beliefs and intentions
101
of candidates. In Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, the court
held that allowing donors to avoid disclosure was not necessary in order to
protect free speech and noted the importance of transparency in helping citizens
102
“make informed choices in the political marketplace.”
Robert Stern, a co-author of the original Political Reform Act, addressed the
same concern in the context of gifts of travel, stating that he had “a problem with

91. Patrick McGreevy, California Lawmakers Head to Maui for Annual Retreats, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2013, http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-california-lawmakers-head-to-maui-for-annual-retreats20131108-story.html#axzz2mA2uiUF7 [hereinafter Maui] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See White, supra note 33 (discussing the value of legislative travel).
95. Id.
96. SB 831 § 3, 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sep. 5, 2014, but not enacted).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Maui, supra note 91.
100. See UNG, supra note 32, at 9 (describing the special-interest group practice of setting up 501(c)(3)s
for the purpose of exploiting the travel-expense loophole).
101. Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010).
102. Id. (quoting McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 197 (2003), overruled by Citizens
United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914 (2010)).
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103

the travel in the sense of it’s not disclosed where money is coming from . . . .”
However, there is a sense that the failure to provide any actual limitation on these
payments represents a failure on the part of the legislation and that it is “watered104
down.” As originally written, the bill would have instituted a $7,000 limit on
105
gifts of travel from a single source. However, that provision was removed as
106
SB 831 underwent the inevitable trimming of the legislative process. Some
commentators suggested that with the passage of time since political scandal
rocked California early in 2014, support for giving real teeth to political reform
107
has ebbed significantly.
This diminished legislative ardor has allowed
108
amendments limiting the reach of SB 831 to take effect.
Despite these concerns, there are indications that the bill’s lack of a
limitation on the amount of gifts of travel that politicians can accept represents a
compromise of legitimate interests as opposed to a waning desire to implement
109
real reform. Legislative travel, as mentioned earlier, does serve a legitimate
purpose and has real value to both the legislators themselves and the constituency
110
they serve. The travel costs can be significant, however, and various
commentators have at times expressed outrage over the supposed waste of
taxpayer dollars used to subsidize traveling politicians, including, most
111
prominently, the President of the United States. While there are valid concerns
regarding the subsidization of legislative travel by interest groups, one author
from Watchdog Wire noted that these gifts of travel prevent taxpayers from
having to provide funding for legitimate travel-related expenses incurred by
112
California lawmakers.
With the travel donations to legislators rising dramatically between 2012 and
2013, the sentiment that somewhere amongst the vast needs of the state may lay a

103. White, supra note 33. While Stern agreed that lack of disclosure surrounding gifts of travel were part
of the problem, he advocated going farther and requiring the state to pay for the travel expenses rather than
simply increasing disclosure requirements. Id.
104. Patrick McGreevy, Calif. Senate Adopts New Ethics Standards, Rejects Others, L.A.TIMES, June 9, 2014,
http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-calif-senate-adopts-new-ethics-standards-20140609-story.html
[hereinafter Senate Adopts New Ethics Standards] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Calefati, supra note 9.
108. Id.
109. See id. (indicating that amendments by the Appropriations Committee are typically made when a bill
would be unworkable or too costly to implement).
110. White, supra note 33.
111. See, e.g., Obama’s Pricey Vacations: Air Force One Operating Cost for 3 Trips. . . A Whopping $16
Million, GLENN BECK, Mar. 28, 2014, http://www.glennbeck.com/2014/03/28/obamas-pricey-vacations-airforce-one-operating-cost-for-3-trips-a-whopping-16-million/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(criticizing the cost of President Obama’s recent trips to Africa and Honolulu).
112. Josh Kaib, California Lawmakers Travel on Special Interest Groups’ Dime, Rack Up $550,000 Bill,
WATCHDOGWIRE, Mar. 5, 2014, http://watchdogwire.com/California/2014/03/05/California-lawmakers-travelon-special-interest-groups-dime-rack-up-550000-bill/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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113

nobler purpose for taxpayer dollars appears tenable. Still, the sponsor of the
legislation, Senator Hill, indicated his displeasure with the softening of travel gift
restrictions in SB 831, saying that “[w]hat works for the committee may not
114
work for you, but if you want the bill to move forward, that’s how it goes.”
Senator Kevin de León is the chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee,
115
which is the group responsible for the changes made to SB 831. Senator De
León’s Chief of Staff described the changes as “improvements” to the bill that
116
SB 831 would have represented a
would make it “more workable.”
117
compromise: allowing the donations that make legislative travel possible, while
118
preventing special-interests groups from hiding behind a shield of anonymity.
B. Donations to Nonprofits
While the PRA revolutionized political regulation in California in an
unprecedentedly broad manner, the decades that followed revealed a need for
119
additional legislation. As part of a broader package of legislation relating to
120
ethics, SB 831 sought to further the underlying purposes of the PRA. One of
the concerns SB 831 would have addressed is the substantial flow of money
121
donated to nonprofit organizations at the behest of California politicians. These
122
payments are legal and monitored by the FPPC.
However, some observers have suggested that donations to the favorite
charities of various elected officials by lobbyists and special-interest groups
could have the effect of currying favor with those officials while evading
123
traditional campaign finance regulation. A Common Cause report estimates
that public officials in California have solicited $105.5 million for a multitude of
124
projects or charities since 2000, including a record $33 million in 2008. Phillip
Ung, a Common Cause spokesperson, stated unequivocally in an interview with

113. Id.
114. Calefati, supra note 9.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See White, supra note 33 (describing the benefits and importance of travel for lawmakers).
118. See UNG, supra note 32, at 9 (describing the lack of public disclosure required prior to SB 831).
119. About the Political Reform Act, supra note 8; see Calefati, supra note 9 (describing legislative
attempts at political reform).
120. See Senate Adopts New Ethics Standards, supra note 104 (describing other proposed laws and
resolutions aimed at preventing unethical behavior by elected officials).
121. See SB 831 § 1(a), 2013–2014 Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as enrolled on Sep. 5, 2014 but not enacted)
(prohibiting the request and payment of such donations).
122. Summer Parkerperry, Brown’s Fund-raising Prowess Targets His Favorite Charities, CAPITOL
WEEKLY, Oct. 10, 2013, http://capitolweekly.net/browns-fund-raising-prowess-targets-favorite-charities/ (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
123. Id.
124. UNG, supra note 32, at 13.
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Capitol Weekly that “absolutely there is a hidden motive” and suggested that
125
companies often “use behested payments to get a favor.”
126
Given the events preceding SB 831, this concern makes sense. Senator
Ronald Calderon, one of the California Senators whose indictment preceded the
drafting of SB 831, used these behested payments to conceal bribes from film
127
executives. Calderon “accepted $60,000 from an undercover FBI operative
128
masquerading as a film executive.” $25,000 of that bribe was to be hidden as a
129
donation to a nonprofit owned by his brother, Tom Calderon. These types of
transactions are exactly what SB 831 would have addressed, prohibiting
payments to nonprofit organizations run by elected officials or their family
130
members, such as the one operated by Senator Calderon’s brother.
While most behested payments to nonprofit groups will not have the criminal
character of those made on behalf of Senator Calderon, the idea of unlimited
payments acting as pseudo-contributions from special interest groups to public
officials and evading the traditional restrictions placed upon political
131
contributions is troubling to political watchdog groups like Common Cause. At
the top of the list of politicians who have solicited charitable donations from
special interests without facing an indictment is the governor of California, Jerry
132
Brown. According to a Common Cause study, Brown has accumulated $3.5
133
million in behested payments since taking office in 2010. These payments
consisted primarily of charitable contributions to a pair of charter schools
134
founded by Brown in the Bay Area, and the largest donors form some of the
135
largest special-interest groups in the state. The combined participation of highlevel politicians and major special interests in the behested payment process has
136
led Common Cause to call it “the new fad in influence peddling.”
While Common Cause has expressed concern about all behested payments,
Common Cause spokesperson Ung states that donations to charities run by a
137
public official’s family member are especially concerning. SB 831 would have
responded directly to that particular concern, prohibiting payments to those types
138
of organizations. Still, SB 831 would have only expanded the definition of a
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contribution to include those that confer a material financial benefit on a public
official or are made to a nonprofit controlled by a public official or a member of
his family, an expansion that would not address all of the concerns of Common
139
Cause.
There are those, however, who support behested payments to nonprofit
140
organizations. Dan Schnur, a former FPPC Chairman, emphasized the
difficulty in legally separating legitimate philanthropic donations from those that
141
are motivated by the potential for political gain. There is real concern that the
proscription of such payments would create a chilling effect on charitable
142
donations as a whole.
Because SB 831 would only have banned behested payments to
organizations owned or controlled by elected officials and their families, groups
143
like Brown’s schools would likely fall outside of the legislation’s purview.
Still, the concern regarding potential improprieties stemming from these
144
payments is clearly reflected in SB 831. The bill would have defined an
organization as “owned or controlled” by a person if that person “is a director,
officer, partner, or trustee of, or holds any position of management with, the
145
nonprofit organization, and is paid for his or her services.” While Brown
founded the schools when he was the mayor of Oakland, his only role with them
146
now is as a fundraiser and supporter. Even Ung admits that Brown “has no day147
to-day management of the schools.” As a result, the new legislation would have
148
left the payments to Brown’s schools unaffected.
Despite concern about the motives behind these gifts from groups like
149
Common Cause, there is a countervailing interest in avoiding discouraging
150
charitable donations as well. In the case of Brown in particular, the governor
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has defended his fundraising efforts with the schools, calling it “the Lord’s work”
and dismissing the scrutiny applied to the donations in question as “journalistic
151
games.”
Senate Bill 831 would have avoided discouraging charitable donations of this
kind due to a stipulation that would have limited the restrictions on behested
152
payments to 501(c)(4) groups. The stipulation thus would have exempted all
charities and schools from its new regulations, subjecting only a single, narrower
153
class of nonprofit organization to increased scrutiny. 501(c)(4) groups include
“social welfare” groups and include organizations such as civic leagues, that are
allowed to participate in the political arena through financial contributions in
154
order to pursue their respective agendas.
By failing to include 501(c)(3) organizations under the purview of the bill,
legislators would have excluded all organizations acting “exclusively for
155
religious, charitable, and educational purposes.” These groups include schools
and charities, including Brown’s charter schools and the organization set up by
156
Tom Calderon. However, while this stipulation would have significantly
limited the scope and effectiveness of SB 831, it is often necessary to amend
157
legislation and compromise in order to get legislation passed.
Despite the limited scope of the new restrictions, SB 831 would have
prohibited the type of payment that Common Cause indicated was of the gravest
concern: those payments made to nonprofit organizations owned or controlled by
158
public officials and their families. Supporters of the legislation contend that
taken as a whole, SB 831 would have “improve[d] and modernize[d] California’s
159
Political Reform Act,” and struck a balance between limiting behested
payments to groups owned or controlled by elected officials and their families
160
while continuing to allow genuine charitable donations.
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C. Campaign Fund Expenditures
The new restrictions SB 831 would have implemented on campaign fund
161
162
expenditures could hardly be described as controversial. The treatment
commentators afforded to these provisions of SB 831 can charitably be described
163
as cursory. New rules that would have forbidden the use of campaign funds on
items including vehicles, real property, clothing, tuition, and country club dues
164
form the bulk of SB 831’s campaign fund expenditure provisions. None of
these, however, are the subject of the bulk of the discussion of SB 831’s
165
campaign fund expenditure restrictions. Instead, the main topic of conversation
when it comes to the campaign fund expenditure side of SB 831 revolves around
a provision that was removed from the final version of the bill: a new restriction
that would have forbidden the use of campaign funds for the legal defense of
166
indicted legislators.
SB 831 and other ethics bills drafted around the same time were preceded by
167
the indictment of three California Legislators early in 2014. The provision to
stop indicted lawmakers from using their campaign funds to subsidize their legal
168
defense was removed “at the request of Senate leaders.” However, the sponsor
of SB 831, Senator Hill, has indicated that he is unaware of the reasons behind
169
the alteration. While the changes SB 831 would have implemented are
significant, they may not fully realize the vision of the lawmakers who sought
170
this legislation in the aftermath of stunning scandal. Those who see the changes
that would have been implemented by SB 831 as underwhelming suggest that as
the embarrassment of the scandal has faded, the motivation to accomplish real
171
reform has faded with it. Dan Schnur, former FPPC Chair, put it this way: “[a]s
soon as the headlines faded, so did the interest in the Capitol for any meaningful
172
effort to clean up the system.” The implicit suggestion is that the motive for SB
831 and other political reform bills was to avoid embarrassment in the wake of
173
the senatorial indictments rather than to implement lasting reforms. Defenders
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of the amendments made to the legislation have characterized them as necessary
174
changes for the passage of the bill. Despite this characterization, the sentiment
that it represents a “watered-down” attempt at political reform may stem at least
in part from the fact that such an emblematic provision was removed from SB
175
831. An amendment so favorable to indicted Senators to legislation created in
176
response to the indictment of Senators could feel counter-intuitive. After all,
the amendment would ensure that these Senators would not be forbidden from
177
using their campaign war chests to fund their legal defense.
Still, the fact remains that the new rules that would have been implemented
178
by SB 831 represent the next step in pursuing the goals espoused by the PRA.
While Schnur and others may feel let down by the final result, the legislation has
179
been endorsed by Common Cause, a watchdog organization. While what SB
831 failed to include has garnered criticism, what it did include would have
180
“help[ed] improve and modernize the Political Reform Act of 1974.”
D. The Anatomy of a Veto: Brown’s Refusal to Sign SB 831
Governor Brown vetoed SB 831 despite the legislature’s overwhelming
181
support. He explained his decision to veto the bill as a way to block additional
182
complicated regulatory requirements. Governor Brown further stated that the
areas covered by SB 831 were already subject to extensive regulation that,
183
presumably in his view, was sufficient.
Common Cause executive director Kathay Feng expressed disappointment
that SB 831, along with other ethics bills passed by the Legislature, were vetoed
184
by Brown. She indicated that Governor Brown’s vetoes came as a surprise to
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the organization “just in terms of restoring public confidence and creating the
185
optics that our state government cares about ethics and takes it seriously.”
Despite Feng’s concerns about the perception created by the veto, the
effectiveness of the proposed legislation was questioned by political ethics expert
Jessica Levinson, who indicated that the bill would fail to “change the way
186
business is done in Sacramento.” Governor Brown’s reasoning reflects the
same line of thought; his veto message indicated that he refused to sign the bill
187
because he felt it would not meaningfully “reduc[e] undue influence.”
Governor Brown’s suggestion that SB 831’s impact would have been less
than meaningful may stem from the sense that the bill was diluted during its
188
legislative journey. Between curtailing the impact of the restrictions on
189
190
behested payments to 501(c)(4) groups, eliminating caps on gifts of travel,
and excising provisions like the one restricting politicians from using their
191
campaign funds for legal defense, Governor Brown had a litany of examples to
point to justify his assertion that the bill would fail to effectively eliminate
192
improper influence. One state official noted that bills like these are often made
as a response to a public relations disaster like the Senatorial indictments rather
than for legitimate policy reasons; Governor Brown’s veto makes more sense in
193
light of sentiments like that one.
V. CONCLUSION
194

Governor Brown is foremost among those who have criticized SB 831. The
bill’s amendments have led some to suggest that it is a product of waning
195
ambition and desire. This ambition that led to the bill’s drafting has faded along
196
with the embarrassment of the scandal that gave birth to it. However, criticisms
of the magnitude of the bill’s potential impact cannot erase the fact that it would
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197

have been impactful on some level. The bill would have addressed concerns
regarding lax disclosure requirements surrounding gifts of travel—a concern
198
which has been echoed by one of the original drafters of the PRA. Additionally,
SB 831 would have addressed payments to nonprofits owned or operated by
elected officials and their family members, like those made to the organization
199
operated by Senator Calderon’s brother.
The legislation was intended to “improve and modernize” the PRA, and
200
according to its sponsor, it would have done so. Indeed, Common Cause, a
watchdog organization that prides itself on advocating for this sort of change,
201
endorsed the bill. “Sometimes it takes a crisis,” Senator Steinberg said, and
what began with significant embarrassment for California’s democratic process
202
resulted in an attempt by the legislature to strengthen that democratic process.
SB 831 would have represented a compromise, to be sure, but its veto nullifies
what appeared to many to be a step in the right direction.
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